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Abstract 
 
The digital age is characterized by hyper-
connected services. Whenever we engage with an app 
we likely engage with a broader set of actors, often 
facilitated by a platform. Essentially, we engage with 
a service ecosystem posing particular challenges for 
privacy regulation. With GDPR taking effect we seek 
to understand the implications of it for privacy in 
such ecosystems. Interconnected services can 
facilitate the diffusion of personal data and thus 
impede with individual privacy rights. We apply a 
novel techno-legal analysis to the flow of personal 
information in service ecosystems. Based on two 
cases, we show that novel requirements arise for 
platforms as key actors in service ecosystems. Using 
our techno-legal analysis we conclude that two major 
platform providers, Apple and Facebook, have more 
in common from a legal perspective than the current 
rhetoric suggests. Based on the analysis, we discuss 
where privacy-preserving solutions in service 
ecosystems need to be positioned. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Recently, numerous cases have been reported in 
which Facebook had a big impact on the diffusion of 
personal data. These are linked by the fact that 
Facebook has illegitimately shared data of users in 
data partnerships to different companies, at least to 
60 device manufacturers [1]. Moreover, Facebook 
shared information with apps, although this was 
technically revised before and should prevent such 
privacy-critical transmission [2]. The most 
controversial case that became public can be referred 
to as the case of Cambridge Analytica’s misuse of 
Facebook user data. About 87 million Facebook users 
were affected by the privacy-invasive access of data 
[3]. Afterwards, this data was delivered to Cambridge 
Analytica which, based on personality analyses, 
placed targeted election advertisement on Facebook.  
Tim Cook, CEO of Apple, criticized Facebook 
how user data is handled on that platform. He stated 
that the “[…] situation is so dire and has become so 
large that probably some well-crafted regulation is 
necessary” [4]. Furthermore, he also stated in the 
context of the Cambridge Analytica case that he 
“[…] wouldn’t be in this situation” [4].  
In this article we examine two published privacy-
critical cases with two different platforms. The first 
case, with ‘This Is Your Digital Life’ (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Digital Life’) and Cambridge 
Analytica, where Facebook acts as platform, and the 
case with AccuWeather and RevealMobile, where 
iOS acts as platform by the provider Apple. The 
cases represent today’s interconnected service 
ecosystems in which personal data is diffused. In our 
analysis, we examine the technical aspects and we 
build on the GDPR for a legal perspective. We 
specify the responsibilities, contributing to a 
realization of the GDPR in practice and the design of 
privacy-aware service ecosystems [5]. Consequently, 
research may benefit from a further discussion about 
the scope of actor obligations in service ecosystems 
and where to position responsibility.  
The article begins with a theoretical framework 
that includes the foundations of information privacy 
in service ecosystems. Afterwards, we describe the 
roles defined in the GDPR. Subsequently, we carry 
out a techno-legal analysis of the two cases. Based on 
this, we position the accountability and derive legal 
obligations according to the GDPR. From this, we 
outline possible solution positions in service 
ecosystems and draw a conclusion. 
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2. Theoretical framework  
 
2.1 Information privacy in service ecosystems 
 
In this article, we focus on the diffusion of 
personal data respectively personal information in 
hyper-connected services. In general, the ways in 
which services are delivered have changed essentially 
in many respects [6]. Service delivery has likewise 
shifted from single services towards ecosystems of 
services [6, 7] (Figure 1). We posit these service 
ecosystems comprise users, platforms, frontend 
services, and backend services.  
 
Figure 1. Adapted model of information 
privacy in service ecosystems [8]  
Users are the individuals with his/her personal 
information interacting on the platform. Information 
privacy of users can be related to an individual’s 
ability to personally control information about 
oneself [9, 10]. In this context, privacy risks and 
privacy concerns exist in the decision-making of 
users whether to share data [11, 12]. However, 
decision-making implies both choice and consent, 
while in reality users have incomplete and 
asymmetric information about actors accessing their 
personal data, which results in an inability to act in a 
self-interested manner [13].  
Platforms facilitate multi-sided interactions of 
different actors [14, 15], typically between users and 
frontend services [16]. In this article, we define 
platforms as a set of digital resources that enable 
value-creating interactions between frontend services 
and users [15]. Examples for platforms are Facebook, 
iOS and Android, which are not limited to the set of 
digital, technical resources and include also the 
governance of this set. In this context, Apple 
represents the platform provider of the platform iOS 
which includes digital resources like the operating 
systems and the AppStore. Platform providers define 
the governance rules that attempt to balance platform 
usage [17]. Here, platforms act as intermediaries and 
can exert control over how data and service flows 
between platform participants [17, 18]. Examples for 
this are Apple’s rules for developers [19]. 
Frontend services access and interact on these 
platforms and offer their services to users in form of 
e. g. applications. Backend services are implemented 
by frontend services for application performance 
management, additional features like ‘Login with 
Facebook’ but also to increase income streams 
through implementing advertisement companies. 
The actors in the service ecosystems can appear 
not just once but several times; for instance, a 
frontend service integrates various backend services 
[20]. The interactions of the actors result in the 
diffusion of personal data in hyper-connected 
services ecosystems [20]. In this context, the term 
“service ecosystems” is used to indicate that the 
included actors interact not only with well-designed 
information systems. At some points, actors make 
decisions that have consequences for other actors on 
subsequent (design) decisions. In total, the multi-
actor information-processing in service ecosystems 
have consequences for information privacy of users. 
That poses particular challenges [21], where it 
remains to be seen to what extent the GDPR in form 
of data regulation can cover these challenges. 
 
2.2 GDPR 
 
In May 2018 the GDPR [22], drafted already in 
2016 after long discussion in the so called trialogue 
(between European Commission, European 
Parliament and the Council), was implemented after a 
two-year transitional phase. Its aim is to protect EU 
citizens' privacy in the digital world in the form of 
data protection and data regulation [23]. One of its 
important changes in comparison to the Data 
Protection Directive it replaced is an expanded scope 
of applicability, binding even companies outside of 
the EU when they process EU citizens' data. 
On the most fundamental level data protection 
offers a binary system of two opposed actors: a 
controller and a data subject. A person processing 
personal data and the person to whom this data is 
relating. However, just as the service ecosystems 
offer a more complex reality of actors, the GDPR 
does not limit itself to this traditional scenario and 
offers more possible roles. In the following paragraph 
we give a short introduction to those roles and the 
responsibilities they bring with them. 
According to the GDPR [22, Art. 4 No. 7]1, a 
Controller is any (natural or legal) person that, alone 
or jointly, determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data. It is a role that is always 
determined in relation to a specific act or set of acts 
of processing [22, Art. 4 No. 2]. These can include 
the collection, recording, organization, structuring, 
storage, adaptation, usage, disclosure, cf. In order to 
limit risks from acts of processing, the GDPR enjoins 
controllers with certain obligations that are meant to 
                                               
1 All further articles without designation are those of the GDPR. 
Frontend 
Service
Backend 
Service
Service Ecosystem
PlatformUser
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safeguard data subjects' rights. Most prominently, 
Art. 6 declares that every act of processing is in need 
of a legal basis, making it the controller’s duty to 
make sure that and declare which one of the legal 
grounds listed in the provision applies.  
Furthermore, certain organizational and technical 
measures need to be taken in order to ensure that the 
controller is also in compliance with all the GDPR’s 
specific data protection and data security provisions 
and is able to prove said compliance at any time, as 
Art. 24 declares. This concretizes Art. 5 (2) which, in 
even more general terms, lays down the principle of 
accountability as one of the cornerstones of lawful 
processing. What makes the determination of the 
scope of these obligations difficult is the rather 
abstract way in which they are defined.  
The measures that a controller has to take are 
dependent on the scope, context and purpose of the 
processing and on the severity and the probability of 
occurrence of the risks for data subjects' rights and 
need to be “suitable” and “appropriate”. In summary, 
there is no general way of defining measures that 
every controller can take without taking into account 
the context and specifics. The specific provisions 
whose compliance these measures are safeguarding 
are numerous. They include data subjects' rights like 
the processors' obligation to information, Art. 13, 14, 
or the right to be forgotten, Art. 17.  
According to Art. 4 No. 8, a Processor is any 
natural or legal person, public authority, agency or 
other body that processes data on behalf of the 
controller. While exercising physical control over the 
processing act itself, a processor has no own agency 
and only acts upon the controller instructions [24]. 
Referring back to the definition in Art. 4 No. 7, this 
means that the determination of purposes and means 
of processing have to remain with the controller. 
While Art. 28 (3) additionally states that controller 
and processor have to formally bestow this role on 
the latter through a contract that contains the details 
of their cooperation, the classification is independent 
from such formal designations and primarily follows 
factual elements [25, p. 8]. This provision follows the 
technical reality of the outsourcing of know-how and 
certain steps of action. Consequently, the GDPR 
privileges such cooperation in two ways: the 
transmission of data from a controller to a processor 
and the subsequent handling through the processor do 
not fall under Art. 6 and thus are still covered by the 
original legal ground declared by the controller; 
processors do not need to meet the same obligations 
that controllers do. Instead, the GDPR deems it 
sufficient to put onto the controller the duty of 
responsible selection, Art. 28 (1), and oblige 
processors to keep records of their processing and 
ensure basic safeguards of data security, Art. 30, 32. 
According to Art. 26, two or more actors can be 
Joint Controllers for an act of processing where they 
jointly determine its purposes and means. 
Consequently, the GDPR’s controller obligations 
affect all joint controllers, although not necessarily 
equally, as the ECJ notes: “operators […] may be 
involved at different stages of that processing of 
personal data and to different degrees, so that the 
level of responsibility of each of them must be 
assessed with regard to all the relevant circumstances 
of the particular case” [26]. On the other hand, data 
subjects can direct their claims on and execute their 
subject rights against whichever controller they like 
or can reach more easily, according to Art. 26 (3).  
 
3. Case studies 
 
In the following, we analyze two cases to identify 
the reasons for the diffusion of personal data in 
service ecosystems. In this context, there has already 
been a call that “[…] researchers could explore 
current privacy violations and their consequences and 
factors that lead to organizational practices regarding 
information privacy” [27, p. 576]. We selected cases 
which have been published in news. This shows that 
a virulence is present and has been brought to public 
attention. We want to prove where critical aspects, 
blind spots or violations of expectations exist. 
To this end, we examine the cases at actor level, 
from both a technical and legal point of view. 
Technically, we examine systems settings, interfaces 
and data flows. This is the basis for the legal analysis. 
We classify the actors according to the GDPR, which 
had not yet come into force at the time of the cases. 
However, the analysis aims at preventing such cases 
nowadays. The actor obligations following from it 
pose the most interesting question. Here, the tracks 
are being laid down for two further questions: which 
of the actors were responsible in what way and did 
they meet their responsibilities?  
 
3.1 “Facebook, ‘Digital Life’ and Cambridge 
Analytica” 
 
The case of Cambridge Analytica and Facebook 
has been widely covered in the media, also due to the 
hearing of Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg before 
the United States House of Representatives 
Committee on Energy and Commerce [28]. In this 
case, users used the frontend service application 
‘Digital Life’ on the platform Facebook. By granting 
the requested rights to this app, users disclosed to it 
their own data as well as the opportunity to access the 
Page 5061
   
 
   
 
data of their friends on Facebook. While only 
270,000 users directly used the quiz app, the data of 
in total 87 million Facebook users was unveiled to 
the app [3]. At the time that the case was formed, 
users had to manually opt-out of sharing their data 
with the apps used by friends [29]. Where users did 
not do that, Facebook enabled apps to access their 
data. After that, ‘Digital Life’ did not comply with 
the platform policy to share such data. The developer 
of the app shared data to the backend service 
Cambridge Analytica, which used it to target users on 
Facebook to deliver individualized advertising [30]. 
Technically, Facebook stores user data on servers 
around the world. Other services acting on the 
platform can access user data by the Graph API of 
Facebook. During the time of the case, the API 
version 1.0 was implemented. Services in form of 
apps could request a huge range of user and user’s 
friends' data [31] caused by the extended data access 
permissions of the API. The 1.0 version was 
launched in April 2010 and was available in the form 
up to April 2015 [32]. After that, the Graph API v2.0 
was introduced. With this API, requests of frontend 
services on user friends' data, which previously 
depicted the critical data flow in the case, returned no 
data to the services [33]. At this point, Facebook had 
restricted the outgoing data to frontend services. 
From a legal point of view, data of affected users 
were initially on the servers of Facebook. By 
allowing apps access via Graph API, Facebook 
opened up the possibility for apps to request data. 
Thus, concerning the transmission of data from 
Facebook to an app like ‘Digital Life’, Facebook at 
least determined the means of processing by offering 
the necessary technical infrastructure including 
possible limitations. Considering that the existence of 
apps on the Facebook platform – and in extension the 
usage of user data by these apps – is part of 
Facebooks business model, it does not seem 
farfetched to classify them as a controller pertaining 
to this act of processing. Whether or not ‘Digital 
Life’ is a separate controller next to them or whether 
they are joint controllers can be left aside at this 
point. Consequently, Facebook would be fully 
responsible for adhering to the GDPR’s provisions in 
regard to these transmissions. 
‘Digital Life’ directly collected two kinds of data: 
profile data of users that installed and used the app, 
their friends' profile data that represent the critical 
data in this case as well as data when a user 
interacted with the app. Profile data was already 
stored on Facebook’s servers while the second 
category of data were created through the usage of 
the app (and presumably saved by Facebook). In both 
cases the frontend service was completely 
responsible for determining the purpose of data 
requests. Since this was known to and approved by 
Facebook a classification as joint controllers should 
be made, at least for the first part of processing 
(sharing of data from Facebook to ‘Digital Life’).  
Cambridge Analytica bought the collected data 
from ‘Digital Life’ to provide target advertisements 
for elections and other purposes on behalf of their 
own clients. Through this collection they obtained 
control over data and started acting as an 
(independent) controller in their own right. 
 
3.2 “iOS, AccuWeather and RevealMobile” 
 
In the second case, the platform iOS transmitted 
via the application AccuWeather user device data 
which were used to approximate users’ location by 
the backend service called RevealMobile. This seems 
to be in contrast to the permissions revoked by the 
user in iOS to access her/his location. The privacy 
statement of the frontend service AccuWeather 
declared that the application and implemented 
backend services can use methods to approximate 
users’ locations [34]. Backend services were not 
named in detail. However, RevealMobile states that 
the technology the company uses “[…] sits inside 
hundreds of apps […]” and “[i]t turns the location 
data coming out of those apps into meaningful 
audience data […]” [35, p. 2]. More precisely, 
RevealMobile focusses on mobile marketing by using 
such data to segment user groups for advertising [36]. 
Technically, the backend service RevealMobile 
gained access to data of the iOS platform of a user 
when s/he installed the application of AccuWeather, 
which was after a review of Apple available in the 
AppStore. In this application the RevealMobile SDK 
is implemented. The user specifies when starting the 
application for the first time whether or not the 
application can access the location via the location 
services of iOS. These location services are explained 
in the iOS settings in the following way: “Location 
Services uses GPS, Bluetooth, and crowd-sources 
Wi-Fi hotspot and cell tower locations to determine 
your approximate location (…)”. Users rejected to 
share this location services data. Despite this, the 
backend service on iOS took a detour to approximate 
users’ location. In this case, the Wi-Fi router name, 
BSSID (Basic Service Set Identification which 
corresponds to the MAC address of the currently 
connected wireless access point) as well as the 
Bluetooth status was transmitted from the iOS 
platform to the application [37]. During a testing 
period of 36 hours, the data was sent 16 times to the 
company RevealMobile [37]. Using this data, the 
company was then able to determine the location of 
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the user by enriching it with public databases about 
stored locations of wireless access points [38, 39]. On 
Apple’s website (which corresponds to the iOS 
version of the case) [40] about location services in 
iOS, however, this is presented differently to the user. 
Thus, it is stated “Tap Don’t Allow to prevent 
access” [40, 41]. A user can derive from this, that if 
s/he deactivates access to location services to 
applications, this is technically implemented in such 
a way that iOS does not return any location data or 
data for location approximation to applications. It is 
important to stress, however, that on a technical level, 
Apple’s statement still holds: RevealMobile did not 
gain direct data through Apple’s location services, 
instead bypassing this access channel.  
The legal classification in this case is more 
complex than in the first case. Since affected data 
was directly transmitted from the phone’s operating 
system to RevealMobile in the moment it was 
accrued, no active act of processing by iOS had 
happened before. Data was only stored on the user’s 
phone, not on Apple servers. Nevertheless, the 
platform iOS provided the technical infrastructure 
and the legal agreement that determined how and in 
which scenarios apps can access certain types of data. 
In addition, the way the existence of apps is part of 
iOS’s appeal to users and therefore heavily important 
for Apple, can be compared to the way Facebook 
offers apps access to users' data. A classification of 
the platform provider Apple as processor, if not 
controller, should therefore not be ruled out.  
One important difference to the first case 
concerns the type of data and data transfer in the 
context of users' actions. While on Facebook the 
overwhelming part of affected data had been shared 
and therefore transmitted to Facebook – although not 
to ‘Digital Life’ when the users' friends are in 
question – consciously and voluntarily, this was not 
the case with iOS. On the contrary, users explicitly 
declined the transmission of what Apple labeled 
“location data” to AccuWeather, thereby implicitly 
voicing their rejection of the transmission of any data 
that might be used to determine the user’s location. 
Of course, one might argue that the accruement of 
WiFi and Bluetooth data is a technical necessity and 
therefore covered by the users' general intention of 
using the phone with all its features. Still, this data 
would not be necessary for a functioning weather 
application – making the user ask for a specific city’s 
or area’s weather is less comfortable for him but 
might still be what he wants. 
On the one hand, the platform’s involvement is 
smaller here than in the first case since Apple does 
not initially determine the precise purpose of the 
subsequent processing. On the other hand, it is the 
deliberate design of the platform that allows apps to 
directly access particular data. The way Apple 
actively changes this design to accommodate 
disclosed cases of misuse can be seen in the way the 
access to iOS devices’ MAC addresses was 
deprecated in iOS 7 [42], the access to MAC 
addresses of network devices (such as WiFi routers) 
barred in iOS 11 [43]. Apple is thereby at least 
contributing to the determination of the means 
through which this data is processed. It is also, at 
least partly, determining the general purpose on an 
upstream level by opening up the possibility for 
approved apps to access this data in the first place 
and giving app developers specific terms of use to 
sign, thereby specifying which purposes are allowed 
and which are not. Apps that violate the Apple 
License Agreement or are in conflict with some of 
the App Review Guidelines get rejected and don’t 
make it into the AppStore. This is also what 
distinguishes a controlled platform like iOS from an 
open one like Windows, where a user can freely 
install programs that weren’t vetted and officially 
included in an AppStore equivalent. While this level 
of involvement still does not mirror the one typically 
associated with data controllers determining all 
purposes and means of processing, it does not mean 
that a classification as controller is impossible. As 
Art. 29 states: even when at the micro-level the 
actions of different actors “appear as disconnected, as 
each of them may have a different purpose”, they can 
still on the macro-level be “pursuing a joint purpose 
or using jointly defined means” [25, p. 20].  
This interpretation of the GDPR’s roles in iOS’s 
case is also in line with the significance the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) attributes to the classification 
of actors as controllers and processors for the 
effective protection of the affected users' rights and 
freedoms [26]. This means that one criterion for 
deciding between possible classifications is the way 
the respective roles allow for a better or worse 
protection of the users' rights. The judgement is based 
on the now obsolete EU Data Protection Directive 
but its results, at least concerning this aspect, can be 
applied to the GDPR as well. This also applies to the 
ECJ’s notion that where several operators are jointly 
responsible, it is not required that each of those 
necessarily have access to the personal data 
concerned [26]. Referring back that data is accrued 
from the users' phone without their awareness and 
that iOS provides the technical infrastructure that 
constitutes the means for the processing and 
consequently has the possibility of somewhat 
influencing possibilities and limitations of access, it 
therefore to us seems commanded to classify them as 
a controller in relation to these acts of processing. 
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For the classification of the frontend service the 
course of data is not as trivial as in the other case. In 
this case AccuWeather never got its hands on the 
data. Instead, RevealMobile had direct access to the 
data of the platform and accrued them in a straight 
line from there without a data flow through 
AccuWeather servers. The way that RevealMobile 
was able to do that was due to their SDK being 
implemented in the code of the AccuWeather app, 
thus an active decision of the app’s organization. This 
raises the question if a classification as either 
controller or processor is possible even when the 
actor in question didn’t consciously know how much 
access to certain kinds of data it allowed another 
actor. Such classification could be constructed as a 
kind of accountability through negligence, triggered 
by implementing an SDK without exact knowledge 
of what the code is able to request. The attribution of 
responsibility connected to this role follows the 
affected actor’s control over the processing act in 
question. Here, AccuWeather once made the 
conscious decision of implementing RevealMobile’s 
SDK for clearly specified purposes. Without this 
decision RevealMobile wouldn’t have had access to 
users' data. AccuWeather was therefore heavily 
involved in determining both purposes and means of 
the processing and should be classified as (joint) 
controller as well. The fact that they not have known 
about data that was accrued does not change anything 
about that but becomes relevant when checking for 
compliance of the obligations connected to the role. 
RevealMobile actively accrued data from the 
users' phone for purposes they determined on their 
own. They used infrastructure provided by iOS and 
by AccuWeather, but for their own purpose and in 
situations that were contractually (if not technically) 
forbidden and therefore clearly acted as a controller. 
In this context, a classification of Apple as joint 
controller seems the most plausible.  
 
4. Discussion 
 
At this point we compare the two cases with 
regard to their factual circumstances (Table 1) and 
demonstrate differences and similarities by looking at 
the actors, their motivations and the ways they had 
the possibility to do things differently, including 
reciprocal consequences and effects. Hereafter, we 
examine to what extent the GDPR’s controller 
obligations are able to reflect the differences. 
Both platforms, Facebook and iOS, offer an 
infrastructure that brings together users and different 
kinds of services, while also offering their own 
services. Through technical measures both can handle 
their infrastructure to limit the ways external services 
can access personal data. In both cases personal data 
was disseminated and, in both cases, this could have 
been prevented technically but was not. 
One major difference concerns the way that user 
knowledge and actions were reflected in the 
processing. In the first case, friends of those users 
that actively used the ‘Digital Life’ application did 
not explicitly deny Facebook this usage of their data. 
However, the option of sharing their data, with their 
friends' apps was hidden under multiple layers of 
settings and by default turned on, meaning a user had 
to actively “opt out” of this usage [29]. This affected 
data was actively shared by users to Facebook. In the 
second case, users were specifically asked whether 
they want to share their location with the app. 
However, even when sharing was rejected, data was 
transmitted directly from iOS via the AccuWeather 
app to the backend service RevealMobile with which 
the location was approximated. This might seem like 
the bigger breach since the users' explicit rejection 
was violated. However, implying the users' consent 
by forcing them to opt out of the sharing and hiding 
the respective option under multiple layers of settings 
instead of asking them when a decision becomes 
relevant effectively keeps the majority of users from 
ever consciously making that decision. In the first 
case, Facebook had been the subject of public 
criticism. In the other case, the focus was usually on 
AccuWeather and RevealMobile. However, the 
analysis in this article reveals that Apple as a 
platform provider can be made responsible due to its 
crucial role regarding the diffusion of personal 
information. At least since the GDPR is in effect.  
As described above, we propose a classification 
of the platforms as joint controllers in both examined 
cases in order to reflect their prominent role in the 
diffusion of users' data throughout the respective 
ecosystems. Following this classification certain 
obligations are inflicted by the GDPR. We will 
introduce these obligations below. In this context, 
another question arises: how should these obligations 
be distributed amongst the controllers and how can 
they be adhered by them? While the question of 
distribution can to some extent be decided by the 
controllers through contractual arrangements, the 
external distribution in relation to the affected data 
subject has to always mirror the impact on his/her 
rights. This means that, while a data subject can 
demand the fulfillment of obligations from each 
controller individually, it makes sense to encourage 
each controller to fulfill those obligations that are 
connected to its area and scope of involvement in the 
processing, since this ensures the highest probability 
of overall compliance and therefore safeguards the 
data subjects' rights in the most efficient way. 
Page 5064
   
 
   
 
 Table 1. Overview of the techno-legal analysis with the focus on the two platforms 
 Classes “Facebook, ‘Digital Life’ and Cambridge Analytica” “iOS, AccuWeather and RevealMobile” 
T
ec
hn
o 
Data Storage Facebook stored user data on servers Data was stored on user’s phone, not on Apple servers 
Interface  ‘Digital Life’ accessed user data on the platform via the Graph API 
RevealMobile used iOS functions to access WiFi 
data 
Third Party 
Data Access 
Subsequent data transmission of ‘Digital 
Life’ to Cambridge Analytica 
Transmission from iOS via integrated SDK of 
RevealMobile in the AccuWeather app 
Data Type App users' profile data, app usage data, app user’s friends' profile data 
Name, BSSID of Wi-Fi connection, Bluetooth 
status 
Data Amount 270,000 app users' profile and usage data, 87 million app user’s friends' profile data  In 36 hours, data was transmitted 16 times  
L
eg
al
 
User Consent Default setting of sharing data with the apps used by friends' User's rejection of sharing location data  
User’s Role in 
Data Sharing 
Overwhelming part of the affected data 
was shared by users to the platform  
No settings options except to disable WiFi or 
Bluetooth functions 
Infrastructure Facebook offered the technical 
infrastructure including possible limitations 
iOS provided the technical infrastructure that 
determined how and when apps can access data 
Purpose of 
Processing 
‘Digital Life’ was completely responsible 
for the purpose of data processing  
AccuWeather determined the purpose, Apple 
agreed by publishing the app in the AppStore 
Means of 
Processing 
Facebook determined it by the design of 
the platform that allows apps to access data 
iOS determined it by providing the technical 
infrastructure and had the possibility of 
influencing the data access 
Appeal 
Existence of apps on Facebook– the usage 
of user data by these apps – is part of 
Facebook’s business model 
Existence of apps is part of iOS’s appeal to users 
Platform 
Classification Joint Controller  Joint Controller 
4.1 “Facebook, ‘Digital Life’ and Cambridge 
Analytica” 
 
Here, the platform Facebook offers the 
infrastructure for the processing of the personal data 
of its users and therefore determines the means. It 
also sets the purpose for the initial collection of data 
by encouraging users to add personal information to 
their profiles and to interact with the platform and 
other users. Consequently, they are obliged to present 
a legal ground [22, Art. 6] and to inform their users 
about the ways they plan to use this data [22, Art. 
13]. Concerning the legal basis, Facebook lists 
different kinds of potential bases on its website for 
different intended usage cases [44]. Since users have 
the possibility to opt out of the sharing of their data to 
apps that their friends are using, the basis of consent 
[22, Art. 6 No. 1] seems most likely. However, since 
this option was automatically activated when signing 
up for Facebook and had to manually be turned off, 
the legal effectiveness of such consent seems very 
doubtful. Amongst other criteria, consent must be 
given freely and by an informed data subject. In 
addition, Art. 7 No. 2 states that where a consent is 
given through a statement that includes other matters. 
Where a user automatically and without explicitly 
opting in consents to sharing his/her data through 
friends using apps when s/he signs up to Facebook, 
no such manner can be seen. Furthermore, the ideal 
of data protection by default in Art. 25 (2) is not 
respected. It is highly doubtful that Facebook had 
legal grounds for sharing this data with apps. 
The second problem concerns the lack of 
information that users received when their data were 
shared with ‘Digital Life’ and then with Cambridge 
Analytica. Here, again, Art. 13 and 14 demand that 
data subjects get informed who gains access to their 
data and what is being done with it. On the one hand, 
obligating each of the controllers to directly inform 
affected users when they each gain access to data 
seems like a logical proposal. On the other hand, 
Facebook as a platform is still mediating the way this 
data is transmitted and has the closest connection to 
the affected users. They should, at least of the 
transmission to ‘Digital Life’, directly inform users. 
However, the information was delayed by years [45]. 
On the next level, the data transmission from 
‘Digital Life’ to Cambridge Analytica happens 
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outside of Facebook. It would thus be too harsh – and 
make no sense with regard to the effective 
safeguarding of user rights – to once again oblige 
Facebook to inform users. ‘Your Digital Life’ is both 
closest to the affected users and in the position to 
fulfill the obligation most easily. 
In conclusion, Facebook would be responsible for 
providing suitable technical and organizational 
measures that allow the gathering of legally effective 
acts of user consent and the provision of information 
at each point where date is passed on to the next 
controller [22, Art. 24].  
 
4.2 “iOS, AccuWeather and RevealMobile” 
 
In this case, missing or ineffective acts of consent 
were not the problem. Instead explicitly denied 
consent - expressed by denying access to all location 
data through the location services settings in iOS – 
was ignored. Therefore, the legal focus in this case 
must concern the question whose responsibility it had 
been to ensure that the current data flows through the 
app corresponded with the scope of what the users' 
consent allowed. This again falls under the obligation 
to “[i]mplement technical and organizational 
measures to ensure […] that processing is performed 
in accordance with [the GDPR]” [22, Art. 24]. This is 
such a general obligation that forcing only one of the 
three joint controllers to adhere to it would be wrong. 
Since the norm is heavily context-depended and 
therefore does not offer a “one size fits all” solution 
to compliance with the obligation, the question is 
which measures could have reasonably been 
demanded from iOS in this case and could be 
demanded in similar cases. 
In conjunction with this question one might look 
at the iOS settings for location services iOS already 
offers its users. By anchoring these settings within 
the phone’s operating system, iOS takes up a 
mediating role between user and app. The user 
expresses the part of his consent that concerns 
location data in the broadest sense through iOS which 
passes it on to the respective app. Therefore, it would 
be consequential to obligate iOS to fill out this role 
appropriately, by denying the flow of data to the app 
for all data that might be used to approximate or 
determine the location of the user, on a technical 
level, as far as such a technical limitation of data flow 
can be achieved by reasonable measures. In addition 
to the case, other technical possibilities to determine 
the location of users [46] must also be excluded. On 
the other hand, such an unmitigated denial of all 
potentially “damaging” data would certainly not be 
feasible. Some data is fundamentally neutral and only 
becomes sensitive by third parties (mis)using them in 
contrast to the agreed purpose, a purpose for which it 
might in turn be necessary to use. This conundrum is 
beautifully shown in the example of iOS’s complete 
ban of using network devices’ MAC addresses in iOS 
11 [43].This ban, a result of apps’ misuse of this data, 
made many network scanning apps inoperable as they 
now couldn’t do what they were designed to do. 
Still, insisting on measures on the part of iOS 
seems to us inevitable. Even AccuWeather’s privacy 
statement refers the user with regard to possible 
solutions when it states that if users “[…] turn off 
‘Location Services’ or a similar setting that controls 
GPS functionality, the device still may automatically 
send or receive this other information as long as you 
[the user] have these other communications types 
enabled. [The user] should read the instructions 
related to [his/her] device, operating system or 
browser to learn about how to control the information 
[his/her] device may transmit” [47].  
In conclusion, no specific recommendation of 
technical and organizational measures that could 
downright and without a doubt prevent any diffusion 
of data that could potentially be used to infer the 
location can be made. Neither can we, consequently, 
say whether Apple violated its controller obligations 
or not. While there are several reasons for negating 
this question, the fact that access possibilities to 
MAC addresses were restricted in iOS 7 and iOS 11 
indicates that Apple reacted to the disclosure of this 
problem. And even while there is no definitive 
solution, the mere examination of Apple as a 
potential controller and the subsequent discussions 
about the scope of their obligations seems to us like a 
fruitful starting point for discussion. Furthermore, 
establishing rules regarding procedures and 
transparency might be an advantage, where the 
knowledge of when and through which motivation 
Apple reacts lies with Apple alone.  
 
4.3 Position privacy-preserving solutions 
 
Building on the findings above, we posit that 
several generalizations can be made. First, and 
arguably not that surprising, platforms tend to be the 
actors within the service ecosystems described in 2.1. 
that have the most leverage when it comes to 
introducing efficient solutions that improve the 
preservation of information privacy within these 
ecosystems. As the gatekeepers regulating who is a 
part of an ecosystem and what is allowed there, 
changes of rules affect all actors and can therefore 
steer away from privacy-endangering trends.  
Second, platform providers can be so heavily 
involved in the process of selecting the players that 
get allowed that it seems possible to classify them as 
Page 5066
  
controllers according to the GDPR and therefore 
subject them to obligations that force them to find 
good and effective solutions for privacy risks while 
making those solutions and their formation process 
transparent. While this paper discusses specific cases, 
these findings could potentially be applied to other 
similarly controlled platforms as well. 
Third, it is apparent that imposing such 
obligations on platform providers cannot be the 
universal answer. Technical solutions possible today 
are always limited, as Apple’s changes in disclosing 
MAC addresses in iOS 11 and the ensuring critique 
showed. Putting enhanced obligations on platforms 
also increases their power over smaller actors, 
thereby solidifying structures that might be 
problematic on other levels and leading to 
unexpected secondary effects.  
Still, we envisage that with shining the light on 
platform providers as potential controllers we can 
start a public discourse about how far their 
obligations can reach, how they can be met and how 
they can be efficiently complemented by the 
obligations imposed on frontend services. The 
development of codes of conduct and certification 
schemes according to Art. 40-43 could help with the 
standardization.  
 
5. Conclusion and outlook 
 
Taking into account the results of this article, 
platforms bear a great responsibility for the diffusion 
of personal data in service ecosystems. With a view 
to media, the case of Facebook, ‘Digital Life’ and 
Cambridge Analytica has been widely covered. It 
becomes clear that responsibility is seen on the side 
of Facebook which is also made clear in this article. 
The thrilling item in this story, however, is the role of 
the sibling Apple within the scope of its platform 
iOS. In accordance with the techno-legal analysis, we 
came to the same classification as a joint controller.  
In total, such platforms take up a big role in the 
agency of the diffusion of personal data in today's 
interconnected services. At first glance it is positive 
for information privacy to read news such that Apple 
restrict using network devices’ MAC addresses in 
iOS 11 [43], that “Facebook suspends 200 apps as 
part of investigation into data misuse” [48]. However, 
these news also show the responsibility and scope of 
actions of platforms. It is questionable that platform 
rules and compliance with them are checked only 
occasionally to be followed by actions – this should 
be done comprehensively and continuously. To return 
to the beginning of this article – from a legal 
perspective Tim Cook finds himself with Apple in a 
very similar situation as Facebook. We make the call 
that responsibilities according the GDPR and 
outlined obligations should be debated for all 
platform siblings, in the whole GDPR family.  
 
6. Acknowledgements 
 
This research was sponsored by the Hamburg 
Ministry of Science, Research and Equality in the 
project Information Governance Technologies under 
the reference LFF-FV 34. 
 
7. References  
  
[1] G. J. X. Dance, N. Confessore, and M. LaForgia, 
"Facebook Gave Device Makers Deep Access to Data on 
Users and Friends.", https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2018/06/03/technology/facebook-device-
partners-users-friends-data.html, 08.06.2018. 
[2] The Guardian, "Facebook shared user details with firms 
after cutting developers' access", https://www.theguardian. 
com/technology/2018/jun/09/facebook-shared-user-details-
firms-developers-access-cut-off, 10.06.2018. 
[3] S. Frier, "Facebook Says There May Be More 
Cambridge Analytica-Sized Leaks", https://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/articles/2018-04-26/facebook-says-there-may-
be-more-cambridge-analytica-sized-leaks, 10.06.2018. 
[4] J. C. Wong, "Apple's Tim Cook rebukes Zuckerberg 
over Facebook's business model", https://www.theguardian. 
com/technology/2018/mar/28/facebook-apple-tim-cook-
zuckerberg-business-model, 10.05.2018. 
[5] C. Kurtz, M. Semmann, and T. Böhmann, "Privacy by 
Design to Comply with GDPR: A Review on Third-Party 
Data Processors" presented at the Americas Conference on 
Information Systems (AMCIS), New Orleans, 2018. 
[6] T. Böhmann, J. M. Leimeister, and K. Möslein, 
"Service Systems Engineering" Business & Information 
Systems Engineering, vol. 6, 2014, pp. 73-79. 
[7] S. L. Vargo and R. F. Lusch, "It's all B2B... and beyond: 
Toward a systems perspective of the market" Industrial 
marketing management, vol. 40, 2011, pp. 181-187. 
[8] S. Conger, J. H. Pratt, and K. D. Loch, "Personal 
information privacy and emerging technologies" 
Information Systems Journal, vol. 23, 2013, pp. 401-417. 
[9] E. F. Stone, D. G. Gardner, H. G. Gueutal, and S. 
Mcclure, "A Field Experiment Comparing Information-
Privacy Values, Beliefs, and Attitudes across Several Types 
of Organizations" Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 68, 
1983, pp. 459-468. 
[10] S. Milberg, S. Burke, H. Smith, and E. Kallman, 
"Values, Personal Information Privacy, and Regulatory 
Approaches" Com. of the ACM, vol. 38, 1995, pp. 65-74. 
[11] T. Dinev and P. Hart, "An extended privacy calculus 
model for E-commerce transactions" Information Systems 
Research, vol. 17, 2006 pp. 61-80. 
[12] N. K. Malhotra, S. S. Kim, and J. Agarwal, "Internet 
users' information privacy concerns (IUIPC): The 
construct, the scale, and a causal model" Information 
Systems Research, vol. 15, 2004, pp. 336-355. 
Page 5067
  
[13] A. Acquisti, L. Brandimarte, and G. Loewenstein, 
"Privacy and human behavior in the age of information" 
Science, vol. 347, 2015, pp. 509-514. 
[14] T. Böhmann, J. M. Leimeister, and K. Möslein, 
"Service Systems Engineering: A field for future 
Information Systems Research" Business Information 
Systems Engineering, vol. 6, 2014, pp. 73-79. 
[15] G. G. Parker, M. W. Van Alstyne, and S. P. Choudary, 
"Platform Revolution: How Networked Markets Are 
Transforming the Economyand How to Make Them Work 
for You", WW Norton & Company, 2016. 
[16] A. Hagiu and J. Wright, "Multi-sided platforms" 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 43, 
2015, pp. 162-174. 
[17] P. Constantinides, O. Henfridsson, and G. G. Parker, 
"Introduction—Platforms and Infrastructures in the Digital 
Age" Information Systems Research, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2018. 
[18] M. W. Van Alstyne, G. G. Parker, and S. P. Choudary, 
"Pipelines, platforms, and the new rules of strategy" 
Harvard business review, vol. 94, 2016, pp. 54-62. 
[19] Apple, "Apple Developer Program License 
Agreement", https://download.developer.apple.com/Docu 
mentation/License_Agreements__Apple_Developer_Progra
m/Apple_Developer_Program_License_Agreement_20180
604.pdf, 10.06.2018. 
[20] A. Razaghpanah, R. Nithyanand, N. Vallina-
Rodriguez, S. Sundaresan, M. Allman, C. Kreibich, et al., 
"Apps, Trackers, Privacy, and Regulators: A Global Study 
of the Mobile Tracking Ecosystem", Network and 
Distributed Systems Security Symposium 2018, 2018. 
[21] C. Kurtz, M. Semmann, and W. Schulz, "Towards a 
Framework for Information Privacy in Complex Service 
Ecosystems" International Conference on Information 
Systems (ICIS), San Fransisco, 2018. 
[22] General Data Protection Regulation, "Regulation (EU) 
2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27. April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46" 
Official Journal of the European Union (OJ), 2016. 
[23] G. Danezis, J. Domingo-Ferrer, M. Hansen, J.-H. 
Hoepman, D. L. Metayer, R. Tirtea, "Privacy and Data 
Protection by Design-from policy to engineering" arXiv 
preprint:1501.03726, 2015. 
[24] M. Martini, Art. 28. "Beck'sche Kompaktkommentare 
BDSG - DSGVO", 2018.  
[25] European Commission, "Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party", 2010. 
[26] European Court of Justice, C-210/16: ULD Schleswig-
Holstein vs. Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein 
GmbH, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? 
text=&docid=202543, 08.06.2018. 
[27] F. Belanger and H. Xu, "The role of information 
systems research in shaping the future of information 
privacy" Inf. Systems Journal, vol. 25, 2015, pp. 573-578. 
[28] United States House of Representatives Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, "Testimony of Mark Zuckerberg, 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Facebook", 2018. 
[29] P. McCausland and A. R. Schecter, "Cambridge 
Analytica harvested data from millions of unsuspecting 
Facebook users", https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/cambridge-analytica-harvested-data-millions-
unsuspecting-facebook-users-n857591, 20.05.2018. 
[30] M. Rosenberg, N. Confessore, and C. Cadwalladr, 
"How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of 
Millions", https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/polit 
ics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html, 20.05.2018. 
[31] A. Hartmans, "It's impossible to know exactly what 
data Cambridge Analytica scraped from Facebook - here's 
the kind of information apps could access", https://www. 
businessinsider.de/what-data-did-cambridge-analytica-
have-access-to-from-facebook-2018-3, 01.06.2018. 
[32] J. Albright, "The Graph API: Key Points in the 
Facebook and Cambridge Analytica Debacle", 
https://medium.com/tow-center/b69fe692d747, 01.06.2018.   
[33] C. Kaşlı, "Facebook Graph API v2.0", 
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/23417356/facebook-
graph-api-v2-0-me-friends-returns-empty-or-only-friends-
who-also-u, 30.05.2018. 
[34] AccuWeather, "Privacy Statement", 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170831185056/ 
https:/www.accuweather.com/en/privacy, 03.06.2017. 
[35] RevealMobile, "Using mobile location data and 
beacons to measure retail shopping behavior", 2016. 
[36] RevealMobile, "RevealMobile Website", 
https://revealmobile.com, 15.08.2017. 
[37] W. Strafach, "Advisory: AccuWeather iOS app sends 
location information to data monetization firm", 
https://hackernoon.com/83327c6a4870, 21.08.2017. 
[38] S. J. Vaughan-Nichols, "How Google--and everyone 
else--gets Wi-Fi location data", http://www.zdnet.com/ 
article/how-google-and-everyone-else-gets-wi-fi-location-
data/, 19.11.2011. 
[39] P. Sapiezynski, A. Stopczynski, R. Gatej, and S. 
Lehmann, "Tracking Human Mobility Using WiFi Signals" 
Plos One, vol. 10, 2015. 
[40] Apple, "iOS 7: Understanding Location Services", 
https://support.apple.com/en-en/HT201357, 04.06.2017. 
[41] Apple, "Turn Location Services and GPS on or off on 
your iPhone, iPad, or iPod touch", 
https://support.apple.com/en-au/ht207092, 04.06.2018. 
[42] Apple "What's New in iOS - iOS 7.0", 
https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/releasenotes/ 
General/WhatsNewIniOS/Articles/iOS7.html, 01.09.2017. 
[43] J. Butts, "Apps Can’t View MAC Addresses on iOS 
11", https://www.macobserver.com/news/product-news/ 
apps-cant-view-mac-addresses-on-ios-11/, 01.09.2017. 
[44] Facebook, "Legal Bases", https://www.facebook.com 
/about/privacy/legal_bases, 09.06.2018. 
[45] A. Hern, "How to check whether Facebook shared 
your data with Cambridge Analytica" https://www. 
theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/10/facebook-notify-
users-data-harvested-cambridge-analytica, 28.05.2018. 
[46] A. Mosenia, X. Dai, P. Mittal, and N. Jha, "PinMe: 
Tracking a Smartphone User around the World" IEEE 
Transactions on Multi-Scale Computing Systems, 2017. 
[47] AccuWeather, "Privacy Statement", 
https://www.accuweather.com/en/privacy, 03.06.2018. 
[48] S. Levin, "Facebook suspends 200 apps as part of 
investigation into data misuse", https://www.theguardian. 
com/technology/2018/may/14/facebook-apps-suspended-
privacy-scandal-cambridge-analytica, 10.06.2018. 
Page 5068
